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Abstract
The rigidity of labour market has several important negative economic conse-
quences: it stiﬂ  es job creation, increases discrimination of those that it is actually 
aimed at protecting (young, women and the low-skilled), hurts the unemployed, 
slows down economic restructuring and damages its global competitiveness. But 
reforms are slow and often marked with disputes among partners in the collective 
bargaining process. Afraid of social security loss, unions usually oppose the re-
form, while governments usually give in to the union pressures and negative image 
of reform consequences created by unions and assisted by media. The characteris-
tics of the labour market and labour market reform with respect to bargaining 
among power groups are examined both theoretically and empirically in the case 
of Slovenia.
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1. Introduction
Institutional framework has been proven to be an important factor of economic 
growth and development (Barro, 1991, Berg et al., 1999, Acemoglu, 2005). Labour 
markets have been widely discussed in the past few years as one of the primary 
factors of lower competitiveness and sluggish responsiveness to economic changes 
in many European economies. But European welfare state tradition and worker 
protection are strong and therefore opposition towards reforms that might endanger 
the acquired level of rights can be expected to be ﬁ  erce. The theoretical literature on 
the labour market relations has shown that the free-labour market relationship is not 
efﬁ  cient. In response to the perceived unfairness and inefﬁ  ciency of the free market 
employment relationship, nearly every state intervenes to protect the workers in this 
relationship (Becker and Casey, 2003; Stigler, 1971). Several negative side effects 
of labour market regulation have been identiﬁ  ed, from less intense job creation to 
even more obvious discrimination. These negative effects of rigid labour market 
regulation, which is characterized by difﬁ  cult process of hiring and ﬁ  ring workers 
and consequently less intense job creation, working time regulation and high costs 
associated with these factors, have lead to intense debates over labour market 
reform in numerous European economies. 
Despite the obvious need to introduce reforms to at least some aspects of the labour 
market, the reforms are being delayed or not implemented. One of the key reasons 
is the political element. The governments, afraid of losing their positions in the 
following elections, are reluctant to implement reforms that might be perceived 
by wider public as harmful to the welfare of the masses. Namely, too often the 
reforms that could in the middle and longer run be beneﬁ  cial to the wider public5, 
are being interpreted by the unions and the media as negative and only the potential 
negative side-affects are publicized strongly. Unions often ﬁ  ercely defend their 
adopted rights due potential negative short term consequences for some groups in 
the labour market and the fear of social security loss6. The delays and decisions not 
to implement unpopular reforms will in the longer run stiﬂ  e economic growth and 
consequently also job creation, as the competitiveness of an economy declines.
This paper explains labour regulation and propensity to reforms through the context 
of political power theory and it contributes to the existing literature in several ways. 
5  For example, introducing ﬂ  exicurity elements has been proven to help Danish competitiveness and 
growth and the model is being mentioned as a solution to enhancing EU growth (see also Madsen 
(2006) and European Commission (2006)). Also simpliﬁ  ed ﬂ  at tax system has been argued to help 
the development in the Slovak republic, especially by attracting FDI (Goliaš and Kičina, 2005). But 
reforms in similar direction have been fought by the unions in Slovenia due to their potential negative 
impacts, especially in the shorter run.
6  In Germany changes to unemployment beneﬁ  ts were in debates for 11 years. The Dutch government 
reached agreement on reforms with labour unions and business organisations in 1982, only after 9 
years of failed negotiations (Doing Business, 2004).Mitja Čok et al. • Labour market reforms in the context of political power theory... 
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First, it links labour market regulations with political power theory in a systematic, 
game theory approach. Second, the game theory approach is justiﬁ  ed by country 
case study, Slovenia, a successful transition economy with rigid labour market 
regulations. The theoretical model, showing how the structure of the elective 
body affects the reform process, is being examined ﬁ  rst by the public opinion 
polls data to justify the decision for ‘not reforming’ by the strength of the public 
opinion. Then the theoretical model is implemented and examined empirically 
in the general equilibrium framework (Bayar et al., 2006; Majcen et al., 2009). 
Our main hypothesis is that in the context of political power theory the reforms’ 
implementation depends on the opinions of low productivity workers about potential 
beneﬁ  ts of the reform. We investigate, whether the initial desire of the government 
to reform the labour market towards greater ﬂ  exibility was actually implemented 
or whether, as suspected, the actually implemented reform was the ‘anti-reform’, 
improving the immediate position of the majority of the elective body.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the theories of employment 
regulation, followed by the development of the theoretical model of the reform 
process in Section 3. Section 4 portrays the case of Slovene transition and labour 
market development, where the (un)success of Slovene reforms, its implications 
and possible development are examined empirically. The ﬁ  nal section concludes 
our work with the main ﬁ  ndings.
2. Dimensions of labour market regulation
To correct for the imperfections in the labour market, countries have adopted complex 
systems of laws and institutions encompassed by employment law, collective relations 
law, and social security law7. According to the literature (Lazear, 1990; Bertola et al., 
2000; Deakin, 2001), government intervention in the labour markets can take four 
forms. First, government forbids discrimination in the labour market and endows the 
workers with some “basic rights” in the on-going employment relationship (such as 
maternity leaves or the minimum wage). Second, governments regulate employment 
relationship, for example by restricting the range of feasible contracts and rising costs 
of both laying off workers and overtime work. Third, in response to the power of 
employers against workers, governments empower labour unions to represent workers 
collectively, and protect particular union strategies in negotiations with employers. 
Finally, governments themselves provide social insurance against unemployment, old 
age, disability, sickness or death. 
7  Employment laws govern the individual employment contract (Botero et al., 2004). Collective or 
industrial relations laws regulate the bargaining, adoption and enforcement of collective agreements, 
the organisation of trade unions, and the industrial action by workers and employers. Social security 
laws govern the social response to needs and conditions that have a signiﬁ  cant impact on the quality 
of life (old age, disability, death, sickness and unemployment).Mitja Čok et al. • Labour market reforms in the context of political power theory...   
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In the literature there are three major theories of institutional choice that explain 
government interventions; the efﬁ  ciency theory, the political power theory, and 
the legal theory. The foundation of the ﬁ  rst theory was set by Demsetz (1967) and 
North (1981), emphasizing that the choice of institutions is dictated by efﬁ  ciency 
consideration in order to maximize social welfare. According to Glaeser et al. 
(2003), countries choose heavier intervention when market failures are severe 
(employer abuse of employees is greater in the market), and lighter intervention 
when distortion associated with government interference become more severe. The 
efﬁ  ciency theory is too broad and as such is difﬁ  cult to reject. 
The second theory, by far, the leading explanation of labour regulation, is based on 
political power consideration implying that labour regulations are more protective 
when leftist governments are in power (Saint-Paul, 2000). Such a protection can 
restore efﬁ  ciency if workers are abused in a free market, or it can lower efﬁ  ciency if 
government intervention leads to expropriation of capital by labour. Political power 
theories can be assessed in two ways. The ﬁ  rst holds that the principal mode of 
political decision making is elections, and that parties that win shape the laws. The 
second, as described by Becker (1983) and Botero et al. (2004), holds that laws 
are shaped by the inﬂ  uence of interest groups, especially trade unions, and should 
therefore be more extensive when the unions are more powerful, regardless of 
which government is in charge. 
The third theory is legal theory that has received considerable attention in the 
discussion of institutional evolution (North, 1981). This theory emphasizes the 
evolution of the two very distinct legal traditions in Western Europe from 12th 
century on, namely common law and civil law that was outspread to other regions 
of the world. Since most of the countries in the world received their basic legal 
structures in this involuntary way, these structures are exogenous to their economies8 
(Botero et al., 2004).
In order to asses the propensity to reform a game theory model in the context of 
political power theory is presented. Growing literature (cf. Persson and Tabellini, 
2000; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005) investigates the importance of political 
process and vested interests for the propensity to reform. The interaction between 
interests for re-election, power of unions and role of the media crucially impact the 
possibility of implementation of reform.
8  Common law emerged in England and is characterised by the importance of decision making by 
juries, independent judges and the emphasis on judicial discretion as opposed to codes. From Eng-
land, common law was transplanted to its colonies, including Ireland, US, Canada, Australia and 
other countries. Civil law evolved from Roman law in Western Europe though middle ages, and was 
incorporate into civil codes in France and German in the 19the century. Civil law is characterised by 
less independent judiciaries, the relative unimportance of juries, and a greater role of both substantive 
and procedural. Mitja Čok et al. • Labour market reforms in the context of political power theory... 
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3. Reform process in the labour market: the theoretical model
Despite the clear indication by theoretical and practical experiences that rigid 
regulation aiming at protection is often harmful (cf. Botero et al., 2004; Bolaky and 
Freund, 2004; Domadenik, 2007), the reform process towards greater ﬂ  exibility 
is very slow. Usually one of the key reasons is the political consequences of an 
unpopular reform. Despite the clear understanding among economists and even 
politicians that such a labour market reform can be beneﬁ  cial to the society as a 
whole in the long run, the reforms are often not undertaken or at least delayed till the 
next election, while only necessary patch work takes place9 (cf. Acemoglu, 2003). 
We develop a theoretical model based on game-theory approach and bargaining 
among power groups in the labour market in order to explain the propensity to 
reform and use the model as a theoretical background for the analysis of the reform 
process in Slovenia.
3.1. Outline of the model
The model will be based on the intuitive model presented by Fernandez and Rodrik 
(1991) and Acemoglu (2003). We will extend it into two period model with several 
interest groups. We start with the simple labour market approach to population 
groups (Figure 1). The size of the population is normalized to 1. Respective 
shares of each group within the population are denoted in Figure 1 (in brackets). 
Total population is divided into active (share α) and non-active (share 1 – α). The 
active are further divided into employed (share β in total active population) and 
unemployed (share 1 – β). The employed are further divided into high productivity 
workers (share of them in total employed is λ) and low productivity workers (share 
1 – λ). We additionally assume that the model is a short term model, therefore there 
is no need for a balanced public ﬁ  nances budget10. 
9  Acemoglu (2003) lists several reasons for such behaviour: (1) voters might be myopic and do not see 
the potential beneﬁ  ts of the reform; (2) the reform might be socially beneﬁ  cial to future generations, 
but because it is not to present generations, there will be a lack of support for it; (3) there can also 
be several veto players present in forms of lobbies or strong social groups that can block the reform; 
(4) uncertainty about the cost and beneﬁ  ts to reform might also lead to opposition to reform; and (5) 
political losers might also oppose reform for all listed reasons and a threat to loss of power.
10 In addition, we would like to stress here that the problem is also solved in the empirical model, be-
cause it is a computable general equilibrium model (CGE).Mitja Čok et al. • Labour market reforms in the context of political power theory...   
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Figure 1: Interest groups in the society
Source: Authors’ presentation
The political reform must be passed in parliament, therefore it needs political 
support. But any party, currently in ofﬁ  ce, will maximize its value function, which 
directly depends on the possibility of re-election. The reform will go into public 
debate. Unless it received sufﬁ  cient public pole support, politicians might feel that 
passing such an unpopular reform (although necessary in the longer run and also 
highly beneﬁ  cial in the longer run) shall endanger their immediate re-election and 
would not pass the reform11. 
At the end of current period election takes place again. Economic consequences of 
the reform will not be known until the next period, meaning that the politicians will 
be very reluctant to pass any reform that does not have sufﬁ  cient public opinion 
support. The reform will be beneﬁ  cial to all in the longer run (and thus bring 
positive consequences to all in the second period), but the positive consequences 
for some in the longer run will be lower than for the others, i.e. some will beneﬁ  t 
more than the others. In the current period some groups will beneﬁ  t from reform, 
others will not lose much (i.e. have a slightly lower wage, but keep their jobs), third 
might lose a lot (i.e. become unemployed).
11 For more on related issues see also cf. Dur, 1999; Drazen, 2000; Persson and Tabellini, 2000; Castro 
and Coen-Pirani, 2001; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005.Mitja Čok et al. • Labour market reforms in the context of political power theory... 
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The main problem in the model is uncertainty. To pass the reform, politicians will 
want majority public support for the reform. But the outcome for some groups in 
the current period is uncertain and they will thus be reluctant to support the reform. 
Therefore, the political outcome will depend mainly on two factors: (1) relative size 
of groups who win and lose with the reform, and (2) the expected outcome of every 
particular group of voters.
Table 1: Outline of the model
Labour market 
reform proposed Election
↓
*
Economic consequences
of reform take place
Period 1: What the groups already 
have
Period 2: What the reform will bring 
to the groups
High productivity wH (1 – t) (1 – T)
Low productivity wL (1 + s) (1 – T)
High productivity wH (1 – T1)
Low productivity wL (1 – T1) with 
probability p or become unemployed 
with probability (1 – p)
Unemployment B1 and higher 
probability q1 wAVG
Increased investment, growth and 
wage impact
Source: Authors’ calculations
The labour market reform will be directed at increasing the ﬂ  exibility of the labour 
market. This implies mainly lower ﬁ  ring costs, potentially lower beneﬁ  ts, or beneﬁ  ts 
for a shorter period of time. The reform will affect different groups differently 
(Tables 1 and 2). We assume that the high productivity workers (H) are currently 
receiving a wage that is lower than their productivity, because wage regulation 
punishes the productive workers at the expense of less productive (e.g. minimum 
wages) (Lemieux et al, 2009, Lazear, E. P. (2000)12. We model this by introducing 
the ‘rigidity tax’ rate (t) into the model. Because ﬁ  ring costs are high13, ﬁ  rms are 
12 As an indication of the lack of relationship between wages and productivity growth, the growth rates 
of wages in the private and public sector in Slovenia can be used. IMAD (2007) shows the relation-
ship between productivity and wage growth in the public and private sector. Let’s assume that the 
productivity growth mainly results from the private sector. Despite ﬂ  uctuations, there is no indica-
tion that the relationship between productivity and wages is straightforward, it is subject to policy 
changes and policy goals. 
13 For example Doing business (2009) data shows that the ﬁ  ring costs in Slovenia expressed in terms of 
weekly salaries are with 37 weekly wages signiﬁ  cantly higher than the OECD average (25,8 weekly 
wages) and the regional average (26,3 weekly wages). Mitja Čok et al. • Labour market reforms in the context of political power theory...   
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reluctant to dismiss some of low productivity workers (L), or at least signiﬁ  cantly 
lower their wages due to union pressures. Consequently ﬁ  rms pay lower wages 
to higher productivity workers implying that higher productivity workers are 
being taxed to subsidy lower productivity workers. High productivity workers are 
receiving a wage wH (1 – t), where wH is their productive determined wage, while 
t is the ‘rigidity tax’ rate. Low productivity workers are receiving a wage wL (1 + 
s), where wL is their productivity wage, while s is the subsidy level existing due to 
labour market rigidities. The unemployed are currently receiving beneﬁ  ts B, but they 
also have the chance to get a job with probability q. Both groups are also paying a 
tax rate T to the government, which is used to ﬁ  nance unemployment beneﬁ  ts B.
Table 2: Results of the model*
Group Share in society Gain / loss Support to reform
Employed 
High productivity
Current situation λ α β wH (1 – T) (1 – t) Yes
Post reform wH (1 – T)
Net gain/loss wH (1 – T) t
Low productivity
Current situation (1 – λ) α β
(majority)
wL ( 1 + s) (1 – T)
Depends on probabilities, wage 
change (s) and tax changes.
Post reform (1 – T) (1 – p) wL + p B
Net gain/loss p B – wL ( s – s T + T p)
Unemployed
Current situation α (1 – β) (1 – q0) B + q0 wAVG Yes
Post reform (1 – q1) B + q1 wAVG
Net gain/loss (wAVG – B) (q1 – q0)
Inactive (1 – α) On average votes cancel out.
* We assume unchanged tax rate T, unchanged B, and discount rate r = 0.
Source: Authors’ calculations
The business sector will be the main winner of the reform process. It will be able to 
adjust their employment levels to economic activity and therefore react quickly to 
turbulent economic environment. The greater ﬂ  exibility will also allow employers 
to focus more on the selection and development of those employees who possess 
proper skills (Čater and Čater, 2009) instead of losing a lot of time and effort Mitja Čok et al. • Labour market reforms in the context of political power theory... 
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thinking how to get rid of poorly performing employees. Data show that elasticity of 
demand for labour increases with labour market ﬂ  exibility (Domadenik et al., 2008). 
Firms hire in good times because they know they can ﬁ  re in bad. Due to the increased 
threat of ﬁ  ring, lower productivity workers will be more inclined to accepting a lower 
wage than they were before. Therefore the subsidy from higher to lower productivity 
workers will be lower. Each group will be paid according to their own productivity. 
The reform will also impact the position of unemployed workers and those that might 
become unemployed after the reform is implemented. Since ﬁ  rms will be able to ﬁ  re, 
they will no longer be that reluctant to hire and the probability of getting a job will 
increase (from q to q1). The government might also decrease unemployment beneﬁ  ts 
(B) in order to motivate unemployed to seek for a job.
The group hurt most by the reform is the lower productivity workers’ group (that 
might be empirically identiﬁ  ed as those with lower level of attained education 
or could also be understood or modelled as workers in less propulsive sectors). 
Therefore, this group is most likely to be quite opposing to the reform. They are 
threatened by unemployment with probability p, potentially lower wages with 
probability (1 – p) and potentially lower unemployment beneﬁ  ts (had they become 
unemployed). But on the other hand, there is a chance that they also beneﬁ  t from 
reform. If unemployment level lowers, the fund needed for beneﬁ  ts will lower and 
thus taxing will decline (T), which means higher wages for all employed. Also, if 
lowering beneﬁ  ts (B) is a composite part of reform, this will additionally reduce 
ﬁ  scal burden and hence taxes.
3.2. Theoretical Results
This very simple exercise has signiﬁ  cant results for policy markers. First, we would 
like to stress that the implications of the model are valid for an economy not in 
distress over a demand or supply shock. In case of crisis and rising unemployment, 
all workers have problems ﬁ  nding a job. 
Now, let us turn to the results of the model. First of all, it is possible to expect a 
wide support for reform from more productive workers [wH (1 – T) t]. This could 
also be interpreted as workers in more propulsive sectors.
The unemployed [(wAVG – B) (q1 – q0)] would at ﬁ  rst sight also gladly welcome a 
reform programme. But a more detailed analysis of the above equation might shed 
some doubt on that. First, if beneﬁ  ts are high (which is the case in many countries), 
the difference between the expected possible wage and beneﬁ  ts is not high, possibly 
it is even negative if all other transfers to unemployed are taken into concern (child 
support, subsidized kindergarten, etc.). Second, the public perception of difference 
between the possibilities to get a job prior and post reform could be biased. The 
reform would increase labour market ﬂ  exibility and thus elasticity of demand for 
labour would increase. But for unemployed to support the reform, the difference Mitja Čok et al. • Labour market reforms in the context of political power theory...   
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between the two should be more than marginal. They must believe that it would 
be easier to get a job. Therefore it would be good to promote the reform in the 
labour market in periods of economic expansion. In such periods expected wages 
rise but above all the demand for labour would be on the increase. A good economic 
situation in periods when reform is preparing is highly important, possibly much 
more than the actual situation just post reform. Of course, the results also depend 
on the structure of unemployment. The longer term unemployed, the structurally 
unemployed and the elderly will be more likely to support the reform. As the 
unemployed are not organised like unions and represent a minority, have low impact 
on the public opinion.
The most reluctant to accept the reform will naturally be those workers, whose jobs 
might be threatened; [p B – wL (s – s T + T p)]. They will weigh between potential 
loss of the job and the expected value of that option, which depends also on the value 
of potential beneﬁ  ts and the level of subsidization that is taking place. The lower the 
existing beneﬁ  ts or the beneﬁ  ts proposed by the reform, the lower the likelihood for 
support. The higher the level of subsidization of lower productivity workers and thus 
the higher their wages, the higher the opposition to reform will be. 
The political support for reform therefore depends mainly on the opinions of 
those less productive workers in the economy14. These also represent the majority 
of workers in any economy. Therefore their vote is crucial. In reality, the lower 
productivity workers might not all oppose the reform. Even among the lower 
productivity workers, the differences are signiﬁ  cant. Some of the lower productivity 
workers are employed in sector whose future is not threatened and their opposition 
to reform thus depends mainly on the level of subsidization from the higher 
productivity workers. Those working in less propulsive sectors will be opposing 
the change much more ﬁ  ercely. The bigger the threat of low unemployment beneﬁ  ts 
and higher the chance of becoming unemployed, the higher will be their opposition 
to the reform. But again, it might be much easier to convince the lower productivity 
workers that their jobs are not highly threatened and that in case of unemployment 
it will not be hard to ﬁ  nd a new job. Relatively generous beneﬁ  ts would serve as 
an additional convincing mechanism. Also, the politicians should be aware that the 
reform will be much easier to pull through in times of economic expansion, although 
the political motivation to change anything when times are good is low. Expansion 
means more jobs are being created, wages are growing and the probability to get a 
job is much higher.
14 An extension of the model could also consider the importance of the expectation formation across 
various population subgroups for the results of the model. The problem of expectation formation 
across various population subgroups has been studied by several authors, for example by Malgarini 
and Malgani (2008) or Wong and Hardy (2009).Mitja Čok et al. • Labour market reforms in the context of political power theory... 
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In this context it is important to mention the power of the media, which channel 
the information to the general public and importantly create the public opinion. 
The media have a very important impact on politicians and their decisions, because 
the media make and annihilate political careers (cf. Besley and Case, 1995; Besley 
and Prat, 2006). Therefore good PR and positive public campaign in cases of big 
reforms by the government is very important. The government should at all times 
stress the positive aspects of the reform and allow a constructive dialog and admit 
that there might also be negative consequences for some groups, but that the reform 
package has taken care of those by certain measures and programmes. Labour 
market reform should be presented to the public as a well thought through package, 
which is not aimed solely at making ﬁ  ring easier and lowering beneﬁ  ts but must 
also take care of alternative measures to increase employment. The more unionized 
the labour market is, the more important is the cooperation with the unions even in 
periods when the reform is being prepared. The support of union leaders will in turn 
also lead to higher support among workers.
The decision for or against the reform is consequently dependant on numerous 
factors, often not related directly to economic problems in the labour market. 
Therefore, for successful economic performance it is important to have a government 
that is aware of the potential traps of policy making and is able to create good and 
credible programmes, which will obtain wider public support. Only so will reforms 
actually take place.
4. Transition process and labour market developments 
in Slovenia
To illustrate the practical implications of the model, we examine the case of last 
major proposed reforms in Slovenia and their fate in the light of the theoretical 
setting of the model. In 2004 the newly elected government proposed a series of 
ambitious reforms aimed at increasing the competitiveness. One of the more 
discussed and problematic reforms were the suggested reforms aimed at increasing 
labour market ﬂ  exibility and the suggested ‘ﬂ  at tax rate’ (Majcen et al., 2009). These 
two were perceived by the general public as reforms that will harm the worker, who 
will be now easily sacked, and beneﬁ  t the rich due to the proposed tax change. We 
examine the basic characteristics of the proposed reform in 2006, the pressure of 
the public on the government, and the actual outcomes and consequences of the 
much less signiﬁ  cant changes than originally proposed. But in order to understand 
the characteristics of Slovenian legacy and economic history, which also impact the 
perception of any reforms, we ﬁ  rst provide a brief insight into Slovenian transition 
and labour market characteristics.Mitja Čok et al. • Labour market reforms in the context of political power theory...   
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4.1. Transition and labour market characteristics in Slovenia
The results of Slovene transition are at ﬁ  rst glance very good. Since 1993 Slovenia 
has maintained a robust average growth rate of about 4 per cent, and substantially 
narrowed the income gap with the European Union (in 2007 GDP per capita in 
purchasing power parity amounted to almost 90.6% of EU-27 average). The 
successful economic performance resulted mainly from higher productivity, 
especially in the export sector (Damijan and Kostevc, 2006), while employment 
remained more or less constant. Slovenia has also managed to gradually bring 
inﬂ  ation down to 8.6% already by the end of 1995. Inﬂ  ation continued to decline to 
the level required to accomplish the Maastricht criteria. In 2006 it was 2.8% and in 
2007, 3.6% (Statistical Ofﬁ  ce of the Republic of Slovenia, 2008). In 2007 Slovenia 
adopted the euro as the ﬁ  rst among transition economies. So far, the transition has 
been quite successful. But lack of political desire and opposing interests of power 
groups have been delaying several important reforms, including the labour market 
reform. 
The rate of unemployment has remained relatively low and was declining during 
transition mainly due to privatization model, which maintained status quo and 
avoided large layoffs at the beginning of the transition. Policymakers avoided 
social tensions with high state subsidies to loss making ﬁ  rms in apparel, leather 
and many other industries. From 1993 to 2002 the ILO unemployment rate fell by 
about one-third, to 6.3%, which is a low unemployment rate compared with other 
transition economies and lower than those of many EU members (Riboud et al., 
2002). The unemployment rate varied around 6% till 2007, when it even fell to 
4.9%, well below the EU-27 average of 7.1% (Eurostat, 2008). But the low overall 
unemployment rate does not reveal large regional disparities, and unemployment 
remains highly concentrated among unskilled and older workers. Moreover, the 
average duration of unemployment has been increasing, suggesting that the bulk of 
unemployment is structural.
Despite successful growth, the growth of employment lagged. The labour force 
declined by 2 per cent during the ﬁ  rst 6 years of transition (1992-1997), while 
employment declined by 5 per cent although real output increased by 21 per cent. 
Also labour force participation rate declined, reﬂ  ecting strong ﬂ  ows of the working-
age population into nonparticipation. The structure of employment changed 
signiﬁ  cantly, reﬂ  ecting the rigidities in the labour market legislation. Many older 
workers retired in the early 1990s, some under company pressure and with the 
encouragement of government-sponsored early retirement programs. The trend 
toward a falling share of older workers was reversed by the pension reform, passed 
in 1999 and implemented in 2000, which introduced (among other policy measures) 
a gradual increase of the retirement age. Young workers faced more difﬁ  cult access 
to jobs because of the tight labour market; while on the other hand, the returns of 
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Major part of the inactive young cohort is in the education process. The number 
of college students nearly tripled by the year 2002, which can be contributed to 
signiﬁ  cant increase of returns of education for all groups of educational attainment. 
Table 4 reveals the distribution of after-tax income using the aggregation of 
taxpayers into ﬁ  ve categories regarding their education. The results clearly imply 
correlation between the level of education and the level of income. More educated 
taxpayers report substantially higher income; as the data show, the average annual 
income of taxpayer with at least university education is 2.5 times higher compared 
with the income of taxpayers with completed primary school or lower education 
(16,792 EUR versus 6,476 EUR) (Table 3). 
Also minimum wage legislation, where minimum wages were set at 48 per cent of 
average wage in 2005 (very high by international standards), employment protection 
legislation that imposes strict regulation on working time schedules and layoff 
practices, high tax wedge and other structural reasons are further issues that cause 
additional distortions. These problems resulted in low international competitiveness 
of Slovenian labour market and signiﬁ  cantly contributed to the low international 
competitiveness of the whole economy.
The labour market is consequently one of the most problematic aspects of Slovene 
competitiveness, besides the pension system, bureaucracy and governance quality, 
which is conﬁ  rmed also by the IMD (World Competitiveness Yearbook, 2006), 
WEF (Global Competitiveness Report, 2005) and the World Bank’s Doing Business 
study (2009). The reports stress especially the tax legislation (including high 
personal taxes and social security payments) and labour market characteristics, 
primarily restrictive labour market regulations, ﬁ  ring legislation, wage rigidities, 
high tax rates and social security costs, problems with employing immigration 
workers, employment of women in the private sector and inadequate education are 
being mentioned as problematic. 
4.2. The proposed labour market reform
Reform in the labour market has been a hot topic on the agenda of several 
governments, but so far it has remained at the stage of proposals, because all 
negotiations with the unions failed. Such a reform would be harmful mainly 
to those less skilled, whose jobs would be more threatened due to economic 
restructuring. The pressure from unions has been thus constantly strong and also 
successful, because so far, except for some minor adjustments, no reform that would 
signiﬁ  cantly help reduce distortions in the labour market was passed. The reforms 
mainly promote employment programmes, but do not tackle the main problem – 
rigidity.
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The newly elected right oriented government, which came to power in 2004, 
had a very ambitious general economic reform plan that was aimed at increasing 
competitiveness of the economy (Government Ofﬁ  ce for Growth of the Republic 
of Slovenia, 2005). One of the important aspects of the reform programme was also 
labour market reform.
The labour market reform proposal consisted of six major measure packages all 
aimed at increasing the efﬁ  ciency of the labour market. Increasing the ﬂ  exibility of 
the labour market was one of the primary concerns of the reform suggestion. High 
ﬁ  ring costs are the primary reason for the reluctance of employers to give workers 
permanent contracts. Instead the ﬁ  rms protect themselves against high ﬁ  ring costs 
with contracts for a speciﬁ  ed period of time. To do that lowering ﬁ  ring costs were 
suggested, shorter ﬁ  ring notice, maximum severance costs, for both workers and 
managers. The reform also suggested introducing ﬂ   exi-time work options, job 
sharing, work from home, which would all also help at least partially to solve the 
problem of population ageing and increase the employment options of women and 
also reduce their discrimination in the labour market.
The proposed change in the salary system in the private and public sector was aimed 
at increasing the ﬂ  exibility of the wage system, determined by collective bargaining, 
to allow for a more stimulating wage system, especially for those with higher 
education and hence higher productivity. The proposal also suggested that workers 
would be able to participate on proﬁ  t sharing, if so was decided in ﬁ  rms. To achieve 
that, several measures were proposed. First, the industry collective bargaining 
would have a less important role; it would only determine minimum wages, while 
actual wages would be determined directly in bargaining on ﬁ  rm level. A wage 
reform in the public sector was suggested, aimed at decreasing ﬁ  scal pressures and 
realigning some anomalies in the wages in public sector. The reform also proposed 
that wage growth should be related to productivity growth not to threaten long term 
performance of ﬁ  rms and at the same time to ensure that workers also capture the 
beneﬁ  ts of increasing wealth.
The reform proposal also focused on the reform of the tax system by decreasing 
the tax burden and simplifying the administrative procedures. Among the different 
proposals, a ﬂ  at-tax system (similar to the Slovak one with a single (and same) tax 
rate for personal income tax (PIT), capital income tax (CIT) and value added tax 
(VAT)) divided the public opinion and was later rejected in particular by labour 
union. The ﬁ  nally adopted tax reform, effective from January 2007, includes new 
PIT and CIT codes, new tax procedure rules, the gradual abolition of payroll tax 
and several changes to less important taxes, e.g. the inheritance tax. Among the 
major changes of the PIT and CIT codes one should emphasize the reduction of the 
highest marginal PIT rate from 50% to 41%, schedular 20% taxation of interest, 
dividends and capital gains, and the reduction of statutory CIT rate from 25% to 
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radical approaches, Slovenia once again decided on a more gradual approach. But, 
as Majcen et al. (2009) show, the consequences of the reform are relatively modest 
and give beneﬁ  ts to practically all taxpayers, while they harm the government 
budget in the short run. The outcome of the initially very ambitious reform package 
was thus ﬁ  nally quite modest, because the government gave in to the pressures of 
the unions and the negative campaign in the media.
Despite the ambitious plans in the ﬁ  eld of labour market changes and tax system 
changes, only minor changes were implemented, primarily in the tax system. We 
show that even these implemented reforms in general were not damaging to the 
welfare of the ‘popular vote’, indicating the power of the negative public image of 
the reform.
4.3. Why is the reform being delayed?
Since the beginning of transition the changes in labour regulations and wage 
system were subject to collective bargaining. In August 1990, a general collective 
agreement between the Chamber of Commerce and the Trade Union Organization 
was signed. In this agreement, the initial wages for each category of workers were 
set, supplemented by industry-speciﬁ  c agreements that effectively converted initial 
wages into minimum wages at the level of industries. At the level of each ﬁ  rm, the 
union and management bargained in the context of the ﬁ  rm’s annual plan to further 
adjust industry level wages. The multi-layer bargaining structure resulted in both 
wage dispersion and rapid wage growth.
As tripartite negotiations between unions, government and employer associations 
might be justiﬁ  ed with social consensus and were used to implement basic reforms at 
the beginning of transition, national wage bargaining in the later stages of transition 
were questionable and led to pervasive effects. Several studies on wage systems in 
ﬁ  rms reveal that almost all ﬁ  rms kept the traditional, ﬁ  xed pay system with a very 
low variable part (Prašnikar et al., 2000; Domadenik et al., 2008) Moreover, a ﬁ  xed 
part of wage in the total wage bill increased during transition.
After almost 20 years of transition, it became evident that a deep microeconomic 
reform of the labour market is needed. Government, Chambers of Commerce and 
Union representatives sat down and tried to agree on new Labour Code that was in 
power since 1993 and has many elements not familiar to a market economy. After 
tough discussion they agreed to a few minor changes, mostly being associated with 
layoff conditions. Although employers warned the government and employees that 
the changes are not too profound, the union leaders were too strong. A new Labour 
Code became effective in January 1, 2003. It seemed that the majority of people, 
the voters, were disappointed by the negotiations and voted for the new government 
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After 2004, the new government started with a more liberal approach to institutional 
organization, proposing a program of deep reforms, whose ﬁ  nal goal was to increase 
international competitiveness of the economy. Initially, ﬂ  ashy promises gained the 
government wide public support, close to 70% (see Figure 2). In December 2004 
the government established the strategic council for development. As intensive 
public debate over reform characteristics started, the reform package started taking 
shape and its liberal character was becoming more and more apparent. Public 
support to government dropped to around 60%. The core of the reform proposal 
was a ﬂ  at tax rate and a labour market reform. The proposal led to a big campaign 
against reforms, publishing TV and newspaper ads, organizing several events and 
eventually in November 2004 unions gathered more than 20,000 people to protest 
against the reforms due to the fear of loss of social security and the desire to retain 
the workers’ rights at the existing level. Unions demonstrate their negotiating power 
against government and employers’ organizations in this manner. It was successful. 
Public support to the government plummeted to only 45% in November 2005 (see 
Figure 2). The union pressure and negative public image of the reform process 
continued. Quite successfully, if the unions were asked.
The labour market reform has (so far, by the end of 2008 and the end of ofﬁ  ce for 
the government elected in 2004) not been implemented. This does not mean that no 
results were achieved. The Minister of Labour resigned and new came to power. 
She is praised by the unions for her understanding approach. 
Out of the ambitious reform plan, the only more signiﬁ  cant change was the income 
tax reform, implemented in 2007. This reform will also have some, though partial 
and limited effects on the labour market categories, such as the labour supply, real 
wages and unemployment rates. But, the reform package was far from the initially 
planned drastic reform. The data, based on the simulation results of Bayar et al. 
(2006), reveals that the government gave in to the pressures of unions and that the 
actually implemented reform. Despite obvious positive effects of the reform in 
terms of employment growth, the obvious result is also that the income position of 
the major voting groups improves.Mitja Čok et al. • Labour market reforms in the context of political power theory... 
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Figure 2: Public opinion poll: Do you support the policy choices of the government?
Source: Ninamedia (2007)Mitja Čok et al. • Labour market reforms in the context of political power theory...   
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4.4. Simulation of the tax reform and its impact on wages and employment
The theoretical model argued that the (un)popularity of a reform package might 
be the main obstacle to its implementation, given that any government strives to 
remain in position after the oncoming election. Public poles data revealed that the 
popularity of the government fell dramatically when the ambitious reform plan was 
presented. After long and scrutinizing public debate, the biggest reform was the 
tax system reform, which also had some labour market implications. However, as 
revealed shortly, the results of the simulations show that one of the key results will 
also be the improvement of the income position for the majority of people. The 
political acceptability of the reform was the priority over its economic dimensions.
In order to demonstrate this issue, the elements of our theoretical model, presented 
in Section 3, were then implemented in a dynamic general equilibrium model of 
the Slovenian economy (Bayar et al., 2006), linked to a microsimulation model 
(Majcen et al., 2007). The resulting modelling framework, entitled SloMod, takes 
into account the structure and all the fundamental mechanisms of the Slovenian 
economy, as well as all the important elements of the structural and tax reforms, 
including the reform of social transfers, changes of the government expenditures, 
and the volume and structure of ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows between the Slovenian and EU 
budgets. All economic agents, i.e. households, ﬁ  rms, government and the foreign 
sector, are assumed to adopt an optimizing behaviour under relevant budget 
constraints. The difference between the theoretical and the empirical model is in 
the level of detail, where the latter, built within the general algebraic modelling 
system (GAMS) and solved numerically with the PATH algorithm, enables the 
implementation of much richer economic structure.
Namely, in SloMod labour is differentiated according to the level of education 
in three skill groups; unskilled labour, skilled labour and highly skilled labour. 
Substitution possibilities between labour by skill type are reﬂ   ected by a CES 
function. Labour market by skill type is closed by changes in unemployment, thus 
introducing rigidities. The responsiveness of real wage rates to the labour market 
conditions is modelled by a wage curve, while the behaviour of labour supply is 
determined through a labour supply curve. Wage differentials of the wage curve are 
derived as the ratio between the wage rate by sector and skill and the average wage 
rate by skill level, while the labour supply curve assumes a positive correlation 
between the domestic labour supply and the real average net wage rate. Taxes are 
also modelled in much detail, where we take into account the existing and proposed 
PIT, CIT, VAT and social security codes, with associated allowances, standardized 
costs and exceptions. Modelling of the government is in accordance with the 
existing and projected budget data.
Having this in mind, the data in Table 3 reveals that the government actually gave in 
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the 2007 PIT reform obviously improved the income position of the majority of 
taxpayers. Although the changes in absolute values were higher in higher income 
brackets, the income did increase, which was a favourable result. Also, the feared 
increase of labour market ﬂ  exibility proved to be exaggerated, as changes to the 
legislation were only marginal. Therefore, the main result of the reform was an 
increase in income with little other change. A very populistic result.
Table 3:  Distribution of average after-tax income, by education (in EUR in 2004 
prices)
Education
Share of 
taxpayers
After-tax income 
(2006 PIT Code)
After-tax income 
(2007 PIT Code)
I2007/2006
Primary school or less 15.6%  6,410  6,476 101.0
Lover cycle secondary school 23.0%  7,247  7,348 101.4
Upper cycle secondary school 33.2%  9,105  9,311 102.3
Non-university higher education  8.8% 12,653 13,001 102.8
University education or more 12.4% 16,375 16,792 102.5
Source: Authors’ simulations with the microsimulation model
As a results, the inequality increased, but the differences caused were not publicized 
enough to be widely perceived by the public as negative. From the social point of 
view, the adopted PIT and CIT codes seemed to be the most acceptable, with the 
present value of welfare changes for individual scenarios of 72.6 million EUR (see 
Table 5). On the other hand, all of the proposed scenarios would increase income 
inequality in Slovenian society to a greater or lesser degree, including the ﬁ  nally 
adopted PIT and CIT codes. However, according to the Gini coefﬁ  cient, the Atkinson 
index, and the squared coefﬁ  cient of variation, this increase is the smallest in case 
of the 2007 PIT and CIT codes. The values of the income inequality measures and 
their respective changes can be observed in Table 4.
Table  4: Projected welfare variation measure and income inequality measures, 
based on household equivalent disposable income (household level)
Measure 2006 PIT Code 2007 PIT Code
Present value of welfare changes 68,887 72,571
Index (REF = 100) 105.3
Gini coefﬁ  cient 0.2730 0.2785
Index (REF = 100) 102.0
Atkinson index 0.2523 0.2594
Index (REF = 100) 102.8
Squared coefﬁ  cient of variation 0.3024 0.3210
Index (REF = 100) 106.2
Source: Authors’ simulations with SloMod and the microsimulation modelMitja Čok et al. • Labour market reforms in the context of political power theory...   
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By implementing the 2007 PIT and CIT codes, total employment is projected to 
increase due to the strong expansion of the private sector and increasing labour 
supply. The total labour supply is expected to increase by 1.4% in 2013 and by 
2.5% in 2025 as a consequence of real wages’ growth (see Table 6). The increase 
in the labour supply of highly skilled people would be particularly strong (2.2% 
in 2013 and 3.8% in 2025). Employment increase is signiﬁ  cant in manufacturing 
(more than 10% in 2013 and almost 20% in 2025 in some sectors) and services (cf. 
Majcen et al., 2009). The expansion in the high technology sectors is especially 
vigorous (13% in 2013 and 16.1% in 2025). Employment increase compared to the 
baseline case is evident even in agriculture (2.9% in 2013 and 5.6% in 2025).
Table 5:  Projected labour market effects of the 2007 tax reform
Labour market category Year
2006 PIT 
Code
2007 PIT 
Code
I2007/2006
Unemployment rate, all skills (in per cent)
2013  5.41  5.55 102.6
2020  3.86  3.97 102.8
2025  3.23  3.33 103.1
Unemployment rate, unskilled (in per cent)
2013 12.00 12.24 102.0
2020  9.53  9.76 102.4
2025  8.40  8.62 102.6
Unemployment rate, skilled (in per cent)
2013  4.56  4.69 102.9
2020  2.96  3.06 103.4
2025  2.34  2.42 103.4
Unemployment rate, highly skilled (in per cent)
2013  0.79  0.84 106.3
2020  0.40  0.43 107.5
2025  0.28  0.30 107.1
Number of unemployed, total
2013   66,177   67,947 102.7
2020   62,522   64,410 103.0
2025   63,900   65,883 103.1
Labour supply, total
(% change in comparison to baseline scenario)
2013  1.42  1.63 114.8
2020  2.09  2.29 109.6
2025  2.45  2.64 107.8
Labour supply, unskilled
(% change in comparison to baseline scenario)
2013  0.80  0.88 110.0
2020  1.15  1.22 106.1
2025  1.34  1.41 105.2
Labour supply, skilled
(% change in comparison to baseline scenario)
2013  1.37  1.58 115.3
2020  2.03  2.23 109.9
2025  2.39  2.59 108.4
Labour supply, highly skilled
(% change in comparison to baseline scenario)
2013  2.24  2.59 115.6
2020  3.29  3.62 110.0
2025  3.83  4.16 108.6
Real wage growth rate, unskilled (in per cent) 2007–2013  0.62  0.61  98.4
Real wage growth rate, skilled (in per cent) 2007–2013  0.97  0.95  97.9
Real wage growth rate, highly skilled (in per cent) 2007–2013  1.58  1.53  96.8
Source: Authors’ simulations with SloModMitja Čok et al. • Labour market reforms in the context of political power theory... 
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As a consequence of signiﬁ  cant job creation, unemployment would decline (see 
Table 5). The overall unemployment rate would decline from 10.7% in 2004 to 
5.4% in 2013, and to only 3.2% in 2025. The unemployment rate among unskilled 
workers (i.e. with completed elementary school) would more than halve, declining 
from 19.8% in 2004 to 8.4% in 2025. Among skilled and highly skilled workers, the 
decline in the unemployment rate would be even more impressive: among skilled 
workers, the unemployment rate would fall from almost 10% in 2004 to 4.6% 
in 2013 and to 2.3% in 2025; among highly skilled workers, it would be almost 
completely eliminated (decrease from 3% in 2004 to only 0.3% in 2025).
Productivity growth, increased labour demand, and a signiﬁ   cant decline in the 
unemployment rate should result in higher real wages and higher real income. The 
increase is particularly strong for highly skilled workers and amounts to 1.6% per 
year on average by 2013 (see Table 5). It is also strong for skilled workers (1.0% 
per year on average). The increase in real household income with respect to the 
baseline case (between 9.6% for the ﬁ  rst quintile and 15% for the ﬁ  fth quintile in 
2013, and respectively 19.8% and 27.4% in 2025) should produce a signiﬁ  cant boost 
in private consumption (around 20% for all the categories in 2025) and savings. 
Savings would increase given higher real return on capital.
5. Conclusion
Theoretical and empirical research conﬁ  rms that a more ﬂ  exible labour market is not 
a threat to employment and social security but actually in the longer run increases 
the dynamics of job creation. After all, employment is the best system of social 
security. The actual victims of rigid labour market institutions are unemployed 
workers and more productive employees while the so-called “lost generation” 
(the less productive workers) who are supposed to be laid off, support stringent 
regulation and are the main receivers of monopolistic rents. Therefore, despite being 
aimed at protecting the labour force, rigid labour legislation has many negative 
macroeconomic and microeconomic consequences.
Despite the obvious need for changes towards increasing the ﬂ   exibility of the 
labour market, the changes are often slow and delayed for as long as possible. 
Due to pressure from both the unions, supporting usually the “lost generation”, 
and the media, emphasizing mainly the potential negative impacts of the reform, 
especially the loss of social security, the politicians usually give in to the pressures 
due to the fear of losing ofﬁ  ce in the next election. Thus often the actual reform is 
being discussed for a decade before a more signiﬁ  cant step is made. And often it 
is ultimately the high unemployment and other economic problems that force the 
government into the decision to reform, not the actual desire and understanding of 
all involved parties that reform has been necessary for quite some time.Mitja Čok et al. • Labour market reforms in the context of political power theory...   
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In the paper we test the hypothesis that in the context of political power theory the 
reforms’ implementation depends on the opinions of low productivity workers about 
potential beneﬁ  ts of the reform. The majority of proposed labour market reforms 
were not implemented due to huge resistance of mostly low-income citizens. Tax 
reform introducing new PIT and CIT codes was implemented mostly due to its 
clear positive effect on increasing net income of all taxpayers. Therefore we found 
theoretical and empirical support for our hypothesis.
Our research gives a new theoretical and empirical evidence of political power 
implications when implementing labour market reforms. However, the model is for 
now quite simple and apart from media doesn’t include labour unions as important 
factor that affect general opinions of especially less educated people. Political 
power theory will in the next stages of research have to be augmented by bargaining 
models between different parties. Empirical evidence shows that those models are 
very appropriate especially when speaking about former socialist economies like 
Slovenia.
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Sažetak
Rigidnost na tržištu rada ima nekoliko negativnih ekonomskih posljedica: zazire 
od otvaranja novih radnih mjesta, povećava diskriminaciju onih koje želi zaštititi 
(mlade, stare i žene), pogađa nezaposlene, usporava restrukturiranje gospodarstva 
i ima negativno djelovanje na konkurentnost globalnog gospodarstva. Unatoč 
tome, reforme su spore i primjenjuju se uz mnoštvo polemika među partnerima. 
Sindikati se protive reformama, jer se boje gubitka socijalne sigurnosti, a vlade 
popuštaju pritiscima sindikata i medija zbog bojazni da bi im preoštre reforme 
smanjile broj glasova na predstojećim izborima i time uništile politički položaj. 
Članak analizira proces reformi u kontekstu analize teorije pogađanja između cen-
tara moći u teoretskom modelu i empirijskom na primjeru Slovenije. 
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